DISRUPTING CREDENTIAL-BASED ATTACKS

STATE OF CREDENTIAL PHISHING

63% of breaches use stolen credentials*

90% phishing success rate with just 10 emails**

1m40s average time until the first response*

3% of victims contacted security*

*Sources: * Verizon 2016 Data Breach Investigation Report; **Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigation Report; *** Vanson Bourne/Cloudmark Survey 2016*

Observed Targeted Staff

44% IT Staff

43% Finance Staff

27% CEO

17% CFO

Observed delivery mechanisms ***

90% Email

48% Mobile

40% Social Media

CREDENTIAL PHISHING IS EASIER THAN ZERO DAY EXPLOITATION



CREDENTIAL PHISHING IS EASIER THAN ZERO DAY EXPLOITATION



STATE OF CREDENTIAL PHISHING

IF WE COULD COLLECTIVELY ACCEPT A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT, IT WOULD'VE FORCED ABOUT 80% OF THESE ATTACKS TO ADAPT OR DIE.

Verizon DBIR on the role of passwords in breaches

* Verizon 2016 Data Breach Investigation Report; **Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigation Report

WHY ARE PASSWORDS STILL A PROBLEM?



Passwords provide weak security

Credential phishing is rampant

Multi-Factor Auth is difficult

ANATOMY OF A CREDENTIAL THEFT-BASED ATTACK



IDENTIFY AND BLOCK THE PHISHING PAGE



BLOCKING KNOWN BAD URLS ISN'T ENOUGH

- Targeted credential phishing is difficult to identify
  - Sophisticated cloaking techniques make pages invisible to everyone but the targeted victim
  - Links to credential phishing pages delivered through non messaging channels
- Attackers have to be successful once, defenders all the time
  - One missed phishing page can set an attack in motion that is difficult to detect

IDENTIFY AND BLOCK ACTUAL CREDENTIAL PHISHING ATTEMPTS



CREDENTIAL DETECTION EXPLAINED

Known user names

- Detect submission of valid users names.
- Uses information retrieved from a connected LDAP directory to detect uniquely created user identifiers that don't resemble real names.

Known logged in users

- Detect submissions of user names for logged in users for visibility and user education.
- Uses information available in User-ID to detect the known user name for the source IP of a session.

Known user credentials

- Exact credential submission to prevent credential leakage with zero false negatives.
- Used to detect the known user name and password for the source of a session, by using the User-ID Agent and the User-ID Credential Agent add-on.

Prevent credential re-use ← → Prevent credential theft

HOW CREDENTIAL FILTERING WORKS



- User-ID agent builds a filter used by the firewall
- Filter does ***not*** contain the original password hashes
- Firewall runs user submission through filter to test non-existence

MFA – CHALLENGES WITH THE CURRENT SOLUTION



PREVENT USE OF STOLEN CREDENTIALS ON THE NETWORK



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

User	Destination	Action
Sales	customer db	**** +
Product Mgrs	jira | intranet | engweb	**** +
Developers	jira | perforce | lab	**** +
IT Admins	AD_servers	**** +

WORKS WITH YOUR EXISTING IAM SOLUTION

IDENTITY & PRIMARY AUTH

SAML | KERBEROS | TACACS+

RADIUS | LDAP

SECONDARY AUTH



BREAKING CREDENTIAL THEFT ATTACK CYCLE



THE PLATFORM APPROACH TO THREAT PREVENTION

Detect & prevent new threats

Prevent all known threats



Reduce attack surface area

Complete visibility



Questions contact:

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paloalto NETWORKS®

HOW DOES A BLOOM FILTER WORK?

1. Collect data and create a table of hashes.

P4ssw0rd!	hash	18	**a0**	**e6**	**a5**	be	cb	68	a3	eb	**67**	27	0c	f6	e9	7a	c3
P4ssw0rd	hash	**69**	c8	**79**	0e	45	9b	5e	b7	94	17	2b	f0	**ce**	**09**	46	81
p4ssw0rd	hash	f1	**69**	7e	66	**a0**	8b	**79**	53	2d	58	02	**a5**	cf	6f	**fa**	4c
password!	hash	**09**	5f	e3	fd	56	**e6**	d7	**69**	c4	23	10	64	59	c1	57	89
password	hash	28	**67**	55	**fa**	d0	48	**69**	ca	52	33	20	ac	**ce**	0d	c6	a4

2. Deconstruct into stream of individual de-duplicated byte groups.

18	a0	e6	**a5**	be	cb	68	a3	eb	**67**	27	0c	f6	e9	7a	c3	**69**	c8	**79**	**0e**	45	9b	5e			
	b7	94	17	2b	**f0**	ce	**09**	46	81	f1	7e	66	8b	53	2d	58	02	cf	6f	**fa**	4c	5f	e3		
		fd	56	e6	d7	c4	23	10	64	59	c1	57	89	28	55	d0	48	ca	**52**	33	20	ac	0d	c6	**a4**

3. Hash data and match byte groups with Bloom Filter entries.

pa55word	hash	87	**a4**	**52**	43	78	7b	42	**f0**	ed	**a5**	**0e**	2a	37	88	1c	84							

